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D
PRAbstract
The goal of this paper is to explore solution concepts for set-valued TU-games. Several stability conditions can be
deﬁned since one can have various interpretations of an improvement within the multicriteria framework. We present
two diﬀerent core solution concepts and explore the relationships among them. These concepts generalize the classic
core solution for scalar games and can be considered under diﬀerent preference structures. We give characterizations for
the non-emptiness of these core sets and apply the results to four multiobjective operational research games.
 2003 Published by Elsevier B.V.
Keywords: Multiobjective analysis; Game theory; CoreCO
RR
EC1. IntroductionIt is currently accepted that real-world decision processes are multivalued. This assertion means thatdecision-making is actually based on several (more than one) criteria. Obviously, using several criteria
implies the non-existence of a total order among the evaluation of the diﬀerent alternatives. Thus, regarding
the scalar case, where all the optimal decisions share the same evaluation, in multicriteria decision-making
the above property does not make sense. In the latter case, the decision-maker may accept many diﬀerent
alternatives provided that their evaluations are non-dominated componentwise.
Modelling conﬂict situations where several criteria must be considered simultaneously leads in a natural
way to multiobjective game theory (see e.g. Bergstresser and Yu, 1977; Blackwell, 1956; Hwang and Lin,
1987; Shapley, 1959). In this framework the evaluation given to the alternatives considered by the agents is
not a unique value but a set of non-dominated vectors (see Fernandez et al., 1998; Fernandez and Puerto,
1996; Puerto and Fernandez, 1995).
The discussion above leads us to consider the class of the multiobjective cooperative TU-games. Within
this class any coalition S of player is given a characteristic set of vectors. These vectors represent the non-UN* Corresponding author. Tel.: +954557940; fax: 954622800.
E-mail addresses: fernande@us.es (F.R. Fernandez), mahinram@dee.upo.es (M.A. Hinojosa), puerto@us.es (J. Puerto).
0377-2217/03/$ - see front matter  2003 Published by Elsevier B.V.
doi:10.1016/S0377-2217(03)00398-9
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
52
53
54
55
57
59
60
61
62
64
65
66
67
2 F.R. Fernandez et al. / European Journal of Operational Research xxx (2003) xxx–xxx
EOR 5770 No. of Pages 15, DTD = 4.3.1
7 July 2003 Disk used
ARTICLE IN PRESSD
PR
OO
F
dominated payoﬀs that the members of a coalition can ensure by themselves. Notice that diﬀerent from the
classic scalar case, in this framework, coalitions may support any of their admissible payoﬀs in their
characteristic set of vectors. Hence, in this class of TU-games one looks not only for fair allocations of the
grand coalitions payoﬀs but for which of the grand coalitions payoﬀs the above question can be answered
in an aﬃrmative way.
When the characteristic set of vectors are singletons, we obtain the class of vector-valued games (see
Fernandez et al., 2002). In addition, if the number of criteria considered by the agents is only one we obtain
the standard theory of cooperative TU-games.
It is also worth noting that with this class we can model any game whose characteristic set of vectors is
given implicitly as the set of non-dominated vectors of a multiobjective program. In particular Operation
Research games (see Borm et al., 2001) may be analyzed within this new framework when more than one
objective is simultaneously considered in the optimization process. Examples are multiobjective ﬂow games,
multiobjective minimum spanning tree games, multiobjective combinatorial optimization games, etc.
In order to illustrate the discussion above, we describe in detail three diﬀerent classes of set-valued TU-
games: the multiobjective linear production game, the multiobjective continuous single facility location
game and the multiobjective minimum cost spanning tree game. It is worth noting that the two former
games come from a continuous multiobjective OR problem (the scalar version of these games were in-
troduced by Owen (1975) and Puerto et al. (2001), respectively) while the latter does from a combinatorial
one (the scalar version of this game was introduced by Bird, 1976).
1.1. The multiobjective linear production game
Consider the multiobjective linear production problem: E½P  v-max Cxs:t: : x 2 F ðP Þ :¼ fx 2 Rp : Ax6 b; xP 0g;CTwhere C 2 R
k	p is the matrix whose rows represent the k diﬀerent objectives of the problem; A 2 Rm	p is the
technological matrix; b 2 Rm is the resource vector; x is the production vector and F ðP Þ is the decision set
for the problem [P ].
The solution concept for this problem is the set of eﬃcient solutions:EðP Þ ¼ fx 2 Rp : 9= y 2 F ðP Þ verifying Cy PCx;Cy 6¼ CxgE
and the set of values of the eﬃcient solutions is:ZðP Þ ¼ fzðxÞ : zðxÞ ¼ Cx; x 2 EðP Þg:RRThis model can be considered as a game when the pool of resources is controlled by n diﬀerent agents(players). Let us assume that player i holds a resource vector bi ¼ ðbi1; bi2; . . . ; bimÞt, i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; n. Thus, if
coalition S of players is to form it controls a bundle of resources bðSÞ ¼Pi2S bi. This vector of resources
makes possible for the coalition S to produce goods according to the following linear production problem:O½PS  v-max Cxs:t: : x 2 F ðPSÞ :¼ fx 2 Rp : Ax6 bðSÞ; xP 0g:NCFinding the set of eﬃcient solutions EðPSÞ of this problem, coalition S obtains payoﬀ vectors in the setZðPSÞ ¼ fz 2 Rk : z ¼ Cx; x 2 EðPSÞg.This framework leads naturally to introduce the multiobjective linear production game with n players
(agents) and where each coalition, S, can guarantee vectors in ZðPSÞ.U
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1.2. The multiobjective continuous single facility location game
A continuous single facility location problem is a set of n users of a certain facility, placed in n diﬀerent
points in the space Rm with mP 1. The problem consists of ﬁnding a location for the facility which min-
imizes the transportation cost (which depends on the distances from the users to the facility) plus the setup
cost. Formally, a continuous single facility location problem is a 4-tuplet ðN ;U; d;KÞ where:
• N ¼ fa1; . . . ; ang is a set of n diﬀerent points in Rm (with nP 2).
• U : Rn ! R is a lower semicontinuous globalizing function satisfying that: (1) U is deﬁnite, i.e. UðxÞ ¼ 0 if
and only if x ¼ 0; (2) U is monotone, i.e. UðxÞ6UðyÞ whenever x6 y.
• d : Rm 	 Rm ! R is a measure of distance, satisfying that, for every r; s 2 Rm, dðr; sÞ ¼ f ðkr  skÞ, where
f is a lower semicontinuous, non-decreasing and non-negative map from R to R with f ð0Þ ¼ 0, and kk is
a norm on Rm.
• K is the setup cost. This cost is independent of the number of users and of the location of the facility; it is
mostly installation cost.
Solving the continuous single facility location problem ðN ;U; d;KÞ for S  N means to ﬁnd an x 2 Rm
minimizing UðdSðxÞÞ, where dSðxÞ is the vector in Rn whose ith component is equal to dðx; aiÞ if ai 2 S, and
equal to zero otherwise. We denote LðSÞ ¼ minx2Rm UðdSðxÞÞ. We impose to simplify the analysis that the
setup cost must be greater than or equal to the total transportation cost, i.e. K P LðNÞ.
This is the classical version of the continuous single facility location problem. Here we consider a natural
variant of this problem in which the users in N are interested not only in ﬁnding an optimal location of the
facility, but also in sharing the corresponding total costs.
Therefore we can associate with ðN ;U; d;KÞ a cost TU-game ðN ; vÞ whose characteristic function v is
deﬁned, for every S  N ¼ fa1; . . . ; ang, by: TvðSÞ ¼ K þ LðSÞ if S 6¼ ;;0 if S ¼ ;:NC
OR
RE
CEvery cost TU-game deﬁned in this way is what we call a continuous single facility location game. If several(more than one) globalizing functions Uj, j ¼ 1; . . . ; k are simultaneously considered then we get a set-
valued TU-game. It is worth noting that in this situation LðSÞ ¼ v-minx2RmðU1ðdSðxÞÞ; . . . ;UkðdSðxÞÞÞ. Thus
the set-valued TU game ðN ; V Þ is given by V ðSÞ ¼ K þ LðSÞ for any S  N , and V ð;Þ ¼ f0g.
1.3. The multiobjective minimum spanning tree game
Consider a set of N users of some good that is supplied by a common supplier 0 (N0 ¼ N [ f0g). There is
a multiobjective cost associated to the distribution system that has to be divided among the users. This
situation can be formulated as a set-valued game with N players and a characteristic function that asso-
ciates to each coalition S a set V ðSÞ that represent the Pareto-minimum cost of constructing a distribution
system among the users in S from the source 0.
Let G ¼ ðN0;EÞ be the complete graph with set of nodes N0 and set of edges (links) denoted by E. There is
a vector of costs associated with the use of each link. Let eij ¼ eji ¼ ðeij1 ; eij2 ; . . . ; eijk Þ denote the vector-valued
cost of using the link fi; jg 2 E. A tree is a connected graph which contains no cycles. A Pareto-minimum
cost spanning tree for a given connected graph, with costs on the edges, is a spanning tree which has Pareto-
minimum costs among all spanning trees (see Ehrgott, 2000).
A Pareto-minimum cost spanning tree game, associated to the complete graph G ¼ ðN0;EÞ, is a pair
ðN ; V Þ where N is the set of player and V is the characteristic function deﬁned by:U
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1. V ð;Þ ¼ f0g.
2. For each non-empty coalition S  N ,
V ðSÞ ¼ v-min Pfi;jg2ETS0 eij
TS0 : spanning tree
;
1 where ETS0 is the set of edges of the spanning tree, TS0 , that contains S0 ¼ S [ f0g; and v-min stands for
2 Pareto-minimization.
Remark that the resulting spanning tree TS0 must contain S0 but it may also contain some additional nodes.
To analyze multiobjective games we extend the classical individual and collective rationality principles
using two diﬀerent orderings in the payoﬀ space. The ﬁrst one corresponds with a compromise attitude
towards negotiation where coalitions admit payoﬀs that are not worse in all the components than any
payoﬀs that they can ensure by themselves. The second one, is a more restrictive ordering that only accept
payoﬀs that get more in all the components than all payoﬀs that they can guarantee by themselves. Similar
approaches to these two analysis have been done in Fernandez et al. (2002), J€ornsten et al. (1995) and
Nouweland et al. (1989) and an application can be seen in Fernandez et al. (2001).
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section we introduce the deﬁnition of set-valued TU-
game and the concept of allocation for those games. Moreover, we analyze two diﬀerent domination re-
lationships that extend the classic domination concept in the scalar case. In Section 3, we introduce the non-
dominated allocations sets, NDA sets, and we show the relationship with the core concepts. In Section 2 we
study existence theorems for these solution concepts. All the results are illustrated with three diﬀerent
classes of games. DRR
EC
TE2. Basic conceptsA set-valued TU-game is a pair ðN ; V Þ, where N ¼ f1; 2; . . . ; ng is the set of players and V is a function
which assigns to each coalition S  N a compact subset V ðSÞ of Rk, the characteristic set of coalition S, such
that V ð;Þ ¼ 0.
Vectors in V ðSÞ represent the worths that the members of coalition S can guarantee by themselves.
Notice that the characteristic function in these games are set-to-set maps instead of the usual set-to-point
maps.
We denote by GV the family of all the set-valued TU-games, by Gv the class of vector-valued TU-games
and by gv the family of all the scalar TU-games.
Example 2.1. Consider the following two-objective linear production problem with three decision makers
(players) in which the matrix that represents the two objectives isOC ¼ 2 41:5 1 
and the technological matrix isC
A ¼ 1 7 7
4 8 8
 t
:NThe resource vectors for each player are b1 ¼ ð14; 14; 13Þt, b2 ¼ ð18; 9; 22Þt and b3 ¼ ð11; 18; 22Þt. Then,
the characteristic sets for every coalition S (S  N ) are V ðSÞ ¼ ZðPSÞ ¼ convðzS1 ; zS2Þ (convðAÞ means theU
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convex hull of the set A):
Example 2.2. Let N ¼ fa1; a2; a3g be a set of players located at the points 0, 1, 2 on the real line and assume
that 0 < e. We consider two globalizing functions U1, U2 given by:
S {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} N
zS1 (6.5,1.625) (9,2.225) (8.25,3.89) (16.75,4,68) (15,5.41) (17.38,6.27) (25,8.58)
zS2 (3.71,2.78) (9,2.25) (8,4) (15.14,5.35) (11.28,6.96) (17.38,6.27) (28.14,9.36)OU1ðdN ðxÞÞ ¼ 12  ejx 0j þ 14 þ ejx 1j þ 14jx 2j;U2ðdN ðxÞÞ ¼ 14jx 0j þ 14  ejx 1j þ ð12þ eÞjx 2j:UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D
PR
OThe multiobjective continuous single facility location game is given by the characteristic setV ðSÞ ¼ K þ LðSÞ, for any S  N where:
The reader may notice that LðSÞ are the non-dominated values of the corresponding bicriteria location
problems, i.e. LðSÞ ¼ vminðU1ðdSðxÞÞ;U2ðdSðxÞÞÞ.
Example 2.3. Consider the complete graph below.
2
The bi-criteria Pareto-minimum cost spanning tree game associated to the graph is:
S {1}, {2}, {3} {1,2} {1,3}
LðSÞ 0
0
  
1
4
þ e
1
4
 e
  
1
4
 e xþ 1
2 1
4
 e xþ 1þ 2e
  
for all x 2 ½0; 2
S {2,3} N
ðSÞ exþ
1
4
 e
 1
4
 2e xþ 3
4
þ 3e
  
for all x 2 ½1; 2 1
2
xþ 1
4
 e2exþ 3
4
þ 3e  	 for all x 2 ½1; 2
S {1} {2} {3} {2,3} {1,2} {1,3} N
V ðSÞ 1
3
  
1
2
  
1
5
  
2
3
  
3
5
 
;
2
6
  
2
6
 
;
4
5
  
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If a set-valued TU-game is played then an interesting question is how an achievable vector vN 2 V ðNÞ
should be divided among the players. It is worth noting that this is the same situation that appears in scalar
TU-games, where the worth of vðNÞ 2 R has to be allocated among the players. Nevertheless, in the set-
valued case there are many elements that can be considered to be divided among the players.
The extension of the idea of allocation used in scalar games to set-valued TU-games consists of using a
payoﬀ matrix (an element of Rk	n) whose rows are allocations of the criteria. Since the payoﬀs are vectors,
the allocations in these games are matrices X with k rows (criteria) and n columns (players). The ith column,
X i, in matrix X represents the payoﬀs of ith player for each criteria; therefore X i ¼ ðxi1; xi2; . . . ; xikÞt are the
payoﬀs for player i. The jth row, Xj, in matrix X is an allocation among the players of the total amount
obtained in each criteria; Xj ¼ ðx1j ; x2j ; . . . ; xnj Þ are the payoﬀs corresponding to criteria j for each player. The
sum XS ¼Pi2S X i is the overall payoﬀ obtained by coalition S.
Matrix X is an allocation of the game ðN ; V Þ 2 GV if XN ¼Pi2N X i 2 V ðNÞ. The set of the allocations of
the game is denoted by IðN ; V Þ. ONC
OR
RE
CT
ED
PR3. Dominance and core conceptsAn important point in the development of set-valued TU-games is the use of the new orderings deﬁned inthe set of allocations. To this end, we must replace the complete order ‘‘6 ’’ in R, for the comparison
between allocations and the characteristic sets, by the considered orderings in Rk, that is, ‘‘be better or equal
componentwise’’, denoted by ‘‘=’’, and ‘‘not be worse’’, denoted by ‘‘i’’.
To simplify the presentation in the following, XSiV ðSÞ means XSivS 8vS 2 V ðSÞ, that is, there does not
exist vS 2 V ðSÞ such that XS 5 vS , XS 6¼ vS . Analogously XS = V ðSÞ means XS = vS 8vS 2 V ðSÞ, that is,
XSj P v
S
j 8j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; k; 8vS 2 V ðSÞ.
These orderings, above deﬁned, lead us to two diﬀerent core concepts in set-valued TU-games. When the
ordering is deﬁned as ‘‘i’’, we have the following deﬁnition of core:
Deﬁnition 3.1. The dominance core of a game ðN ; V Þ 2 GV is the set of allocations, X 2 IðN ; V Þ, such that
XSiV ðSÞ 8S  N . We will denote this set as CðN ; V ;iÞ.
Nevertheless, it may happen that in some situations the preference structure assumed by the agents is
stronger, and coalitions only accept allocations if they get more than the worth given by the characteristic
set. This assumption modiﬁes the rationale of the decision process under the game and, therefore, the core
concept will be modiﬁed accordingly. Proceeding similarly, we introduce now the concept of core with
respect to the strong ordering, that we will call the preference core.
Deﬁnition 3.2. The preference core of a game ðN ; V Þ 2 GV is the set of allocations, X 2 IðN ; V Þ, such that
XS = V ðSÞ 8S  N . We will denote this set as CðN ; v;=Þ.
The preference core is always included in the dominance core. Thus, it may happen that the former set is
empty while the latter set is not. Nevertheless, if the preference core is non-empty then the players will only
agree on allocations within this set because all the players will be better oﬀ without assuming any com-
promise. Therefore, this solution concept must be considered in any set-valued game provided that we are
given tools to check whether it is non-empty.
The dominance core deﬁned above coincides with the set of stable outcomes (SO) introduced by van den
Nouweland et al. (1989). Thus, our treatment is similar to that of these authors although our character-U
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
206
207
209
211
212
213
214
215
216
218
219
221
222
223
224
225
226
F.R. Fernandez et al. / European Journal of Operational Research xxx (2003) xxx–xxx 7
EOR 5770 No. of Pages 15, DTD = 4.3.1
7 July 2003 Disk used
ARTICLE IN PRESSRO
OF
ization is diﬀerent. In addition, we characterize the preference core, a concept not considered in the above
mentioned paper.
Example 3.1. Let us assume a production situation where three agents can produce, using three diﬀerent
technologies A, B, C, two types of goods. The characteristic set of any coalition S is given by the production
levels of each good using the existing technologies, i.e. V ðSÞ is a set of three vectors (technologies) with two
components each one (goods). The following table deﬁnes the characteristic set-valued map of the game
ðN ; V Þ.
If the agents decide to cooperate and to produce with the technology A they must allocate the vector
of goods (5,4), the allocation
S {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} N
A (1/2,1) (5/2,3/2) (1,2) (5,4)
B (1,1/2) (2,2) (2,1) (6,3)
C (4/5,3/4) (3,1) (3/2,4/3) (3,6)P
X ¼ 2 2 1
1 1 2
 is in the preference core, while D
Y ¼ 1 3=2 5=2
3=2 3=2 1
 NC
OR
RE
CT
E
is in the dominance core and not in the preference core since Y f1;2g ¼ ð5=2; 3Þjð3; 1Þ, the third element of
the characteristic set V ðf1; 2gÞ.
Imputations in the core (any of them) will be acceptable if no coalition can argue against its allocated
amount XS . To this end, we use the following dominance concepts, where Rk= stands for fx 2 Rk : xP 0g.
Deﬁnition 3.3. Let us consider two matrices X , Y 2 Rk	n and a coalition S 2 N .
1. Y dominates X through S according to i, and we will denote Y dom
S
iX , if:
(a) Y SiXS , Y S 6¼ XS ,
(b) Y S 2 V ðSÞ  Rk=.
2. Y dominates X through S according to =, and we will denote Y dom
S
PX , if:
(a) Y S = XS , Y S 6¼ XS ,
(b) Y S 2 V ðSÞ  Rk=.
In scalar TU-games the set of non-dominated imputations has been widely considered (see Driessen, 1988
and the references therein). Nevertheless, in set-valued TU-games the concept which plays the important
role is the NDA set. These sets are deﬁned by:
1. NDAðN ; V ;iÞ ¼ fX 2 IðN ; V Þsuch that 9= S  N , Y 2 IðN ; V Þ, Y dom
S
iXg,
2. NDAðN ; V ;=Þ ¼ fX 2 IðN ; V Þsuch that 9= S 2 N , Y 2 IðN ; V Þ, Y dom
S
PXg.U
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Theorem 3.1. The core sets hold the following properties:
1. CðN ; V ;=Þ ¼ NDAðN ; V ;iÞ,
2. CðN ; V ;iÞ ¼ NDAðN ; V ;=Þ.OO
FProof. We only prove 1. the proof of 2. being similar.
1. ) Suppose that X 2 CðN ; V ;=Þ and that X 62 NDAðN ; V ;iÞ. Then there exists S  N and
Y 2 IðN ; V Þ, such that Y dom
S
iX , that is, Y SiXS , Y S 6¼ XS and Y S 2 V ðSÞ  Rk=, but it is not possible
because XS = V ðSÞ.
( Suppose that X 2 NDAðN ; V ;iÞ and that X 62 CðN ; V ;=Þ. Then, there exists S  N and vS 2 V ðSÞ,
such that XS is not better componentwise then vS , that is, vSiXS . Now let us construct an allocation, Y , of
vS as follows: R
Y i ¼
vS
jSj 8i 2 S;
0 8i 62 S:
 P
Allocation Y of vS 2 V ðSÞ dominates allocation X through coalition S according toi because Y S ¼ vSiXS
and Y S 2 V ðSÞ. Hence, it contradicts that X 2 NDAðN ; V ;iÞ. CT
ED4. Existence theoremsOnce, we have deﬁned the two core concepts and their relationships it is important to give conditions
that ensure non-emptiness of these cores.
4.1. Dominance core
For each scalarized vector k 2 K, E
K ¼ k 2 Rk; kj
(
> 0; j ¼ 1; . . . ; k such that
Xk
j¼1
kj ¼ 1
)Rand any game ðN ; V Þ 2 GV , we deﬁne the scalar game ðN ; vkÞ 2 gv as:Rvkð;Þ ¼ 0; vkðSÞ ¼ maxvS2V ðSÞRk= ktvS ; 8S  N ; S 6¼ ;: ð1ÞUN
CO
Using the game deﬁned in (1) we establish a suﬃcient condition for the non-emptiness of the dominance
core.
Theorem 4.1. The core CðN ; V ;iÞ of the game ðN ; V Þ 2 GV is non-empty if there exists k^ 2 K such that the
scalar game ðN ; vk^Þ 2 gv is balanced and it satisfies vk^ðNÞ 6¼ 0.
Proof. Let it k^ be a weight in K such that the scalar game ðN ; vk^Þ 2 gv, deﬁned in (1), is balanced and verify
vk^ðNÞ 6¼ 0. Consider zS 2 ðV ðSÞ  Rk=Þ such that k^tzS ¼ vk^ðSÞ 8S  N . Notice that zS 2 V ðSÞ, otherwise it is
possible to ﬁnd another vector vS 2 V ðSÞ such that zS 5 vS , zS 6¼ vS, and then k^tzS < k^tvS. By Bondareva and
Shapley theorem (see Bondareva, 1963) there exists an allocation x 2 CðN ; vk^Þ.
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ARTICLE IN PRESSNow consider the matrix X 2 Rk	n whose columns are:X i ¼ x
i
vk^ðNÞ
zN 8i 2 N :Since vk^ðNÞ 6¼ 0, we prove that X 2 CðN ; V ;iÞ. Indeed,XN ¼
Xn
i¼1
xi
vk^ðNÞ
zN ¼ zN Fand then X 2 IðN ; V Þ. Assume that X 62 CðN ; V ;iÞ. Then, there exists a coalition S  N and a vector
wS 2 V ðSÞ such that XS 6wS , XS 6¼ wS , that is, k^tX S < k^twS . Then: Omax
vS2V ðSÞRk=
k^tvS P k^twS > k^tX S ¼
X
i2S
k^tX i ¼
P
i2S x
i
vk^ðNÞ
k^tzN ¼ xS P vk^ðSÞ ¼ max
vS2V ðSÞRk=
k^tvS :D
PR
OThis is a contradiction. 
This results is useful in ﬁnding elements in the dominance core of diﬀerent set-valued games.
4.1.1. Multiobjective linear programming games
The set-valued characteristic function is usually deﬁned through the set of non-dominated values of a
multiobjective programming problem. A particular case of these games are the Multiobjective Linear
Production Games. These games are characterized because the objective functions of the multiobjective
program are linear. In this situation we can obtain an allocation of the dominance core for any
z ¼ Cx 2 V ðNÞ. Indeed, given z ¼ Cx 2 V ðNÞ, it is well-known that there exists a vector of weights k^ 2 Rk,
k^ > 0, such that x is the solution of the scalar problem: E½PN ðk^Þmax k^tCx
s:t: : x 2 F ðPNÞ:RE
CTLet u be an optimal solution of the dual problem of ½PN ðk^Þ. The matrix X  ¼ ðX 1;X 2; . . . ;XnÞ whosecolumns are X i ¼ ðubi=k^tzÞz belongs to the dominance core. This follows from Theorem 4.1. Notice thatX  is an allocation of z.
We note in passing that the choice of z 2 V ðNÞ can be done taking a weighting vector k > 0. Procedures
guiding the agents to the choice of weighting vectors are described in Marmol et al. (2002) and the ref-
erences therein.
Example 2.1 (continued). Let us take k^ ¼ ð0:8; 0:2Þ. The problem PNðk^Þ is:Rmax 1:9x1 þ 3:4x2s:a: : x1 þ 8x26 43; 7x1 þ 4x26 41; 7x1 þ 8x26 57; x1; x2 P 0:OAn optimal solution of PNðk^Þ is x1 ¼ ð2:3^; 5:083^Þ with objective value z1 ¼ ð25; 8:583^Þ. An the optimal so-lution of the dual of PN ðk^Þ is u ¼ ð0:179167; 0; 0:245833Þ. The allocation in the dominance core obtained by
the above method, is: C
X  ¼ 6:567 9:938 8:495
2:254 3:412 2:917
 
:UN4.1.2. Multiobjective continuous single facility location gamesFor this class of games we can provide a method to construct allocations in the dominance core. Theapproach consists of applying Theorem 4.1 transforming the multiobjective game into a scalar continuous
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ARTICLE IN PRESSOF
single facility location game. Conditions for the non-emptiness of the corresponding core set are given in
Puerto et al. (2001).
Example 2.2 (continued). We apply Theorem 4.1 with k ¼ 1=2. Thus, we obtain the corresponding scalar
game whose characteristic function vkðSÞ ¼ K þ LðSÞ where LðSÞ is given by:
According to Puerto et al. (2001) the egalitarian allocation ðK=3þ 1=4;K=3þ 1=4;K=3þ 1=4Þ belongs to
the core of this scalar game. Therefore, the egalitarian allocation of the vector
S {1},{2},{3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} N
LðSÞ 0 1/4 3=4 e 1/4 3/4K þ 5=4 e
K þ 3=4 e
 
; OD
PR
that corresponds to the non-dominated value in V ðNÞ for x ¼ 2, belongs to the dominance core.
4.1.3. Multiobjective minimum cost spanning tree games
We can provide a method to obtain allocations in the dominance core. A way to deal with this problem is
using topological orders in Rk. As was shown in Ehrgott (2000), every Pareto optimal spanning tree of a
graph is a conventional mcst using the appropriate topological order. Restricting to topological orders
induced by an increasing linear utility function, the mcst obtained from the weighted graph is a Pareto
optimal tree.
In order to ﬁnd a condition that permits to divide among the players a total cost zN 2 V ðNÞ accordingly
with a given strictly increasing linear utility function, u, we will deﬁne the following scalar game ðN ; vuÞ:Evuð;Þ ¼ 0; vuðSÞ ¼ min
zS2V ðSÞ
uðzSÞ; 8S  N ; S 6¼ ;:CTUsing any allocation in the core of the game ðN ; vuÞ, we can construct dominance core allocations forsome zN 2 V ðNÞ.Let x ¼ ðx1; . . . ; xnÞ be the Birds allocation of the game ðN ; vuÞ (see Bird, 1976). This vector allows us to
give a proportional allocation of zN 2 V ðNÞ deﬁned by:EX ¼ ðX 1; . . . ;XnÞ; where X i ¼ xi
uðzN Þ z
N 8i 2 N :NC
OR
RThis allocation belongs to the dominance core by Theorem 4.1.
Example 2.3 (continued). Suppose that the strictly increasing linear utility function, u, used to compare the
worth of the coalitions consists of giving triple importance to the second criterion, that is, the utility of
vector a is uðaÞ ¼ a1 þ 3a2. Then, the scalar game ðN ; vuÞ is:
In this case, vuðNÞ ¼ uðð4; 5ÞtÞ, the mcst for the weighted graph is the Pareto-optimal tree associated to
zN ¼ ð4; 5Þt and ðN ; vuÞ is the mcst-game associated to the weighted graph.
S {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} N
vuðSÞ 10 7 6 11 18 16 19U
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ARTICLE IN PRESSOFTherefore Birds cost allocation x ¼ ð4; 7; 8Þ is in the core of ðN ; vuÞ. Then the proportional allocationOX ¼ 1619 2819 321920
19
35
19
40
19
0
BB@
1
CCA 2 CðN ; V ;jÞ: RP4.2. Preference core
This section is devoted to characterize the non-emptiness of the preference core. Associated with a
coalition S in the game ðN ; V Þ 2 GV we consider k diﬀerent scalar problems:D½PSðjÞmax vSj
s:t: : vS 2 V ðSÞ  Rk=;EC
TEwhere vSj , j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; k, is the jth component of vector vS . The reader may notice that for cost games thecorresponding problems ½PSðjÞ would be minimization problems.Let us denote by zðS; jÞ the value associated with an optimal solution of problem ½PSðjÞ and by zðSÞ the
k-dimensional vector zðSÞ ¼ ðzðS; 1Þ; zðS; 2Þ; . . . ; zðS; kÞÞ.
Notice that for a ﬁxed coalition S if an allocation X of the set-valued TU-game, ðN ; V Þ 2 GV , satisﬁes
XS = V ðSÞ then XS = zðSÞ and conversely.
For each z^ ¼ ðz^1; . . . ; z^kÞ 2 V ðNÞ, we introduce ðN ; vz^jÞ, the scalar j-component game, j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; k,
deﬁned as follows:vz^jð;Þ ¼ 0; vz^jðSÞ ¼ zðS; jÞ 8S  N and vz^jðNÞ ¼ z^j: ð2ÞNC
OR
R
A necessary and suﬃcient condition for the non-emptiness of the preference core is given in the next
result.
Theorem 4.2. The preference core is non-empty if and only if there exists at least one z^ 2 V ðNÞ such that all
the scalar j-component games ðN ; vz^jÞ are balanced.
Proof. If every scalar j-component game ðN ; vz^jÞ is balanced, consider any allocation, Xj, in the core of
ðN ; vz^jÞ, j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; k. Then, the k 	 n-matrix X whose rows are Xj, j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; k, is an allocation asso-
ciated with z^. Moreover, for each S  N , XS = zðSÞ and XS = V ðSÞ.
Conversely, let X be an allocation in the preference core such that XN ¼ z^ 2 V ðNÞ. Then XS = V ðSÞ,
8S  N and XS P zðSÞ, 8S  N . Therefore, Xj is an allocation in the core ðN ; vz^jÞ. U
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ARTICLE IN PRESSWe can also give a similar but reﬁned suﬃcient condition. Let z be a k-dimensional vector not necessarily
in V ðNÞ and consider the scalar game ðN ; vzjÞ as deﬁned above.
Corollary 4.1. If ðN ; vzjÞ is balanced for any j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; k and there exists z^ 2 V ðNÞ such that z^ = z, then
there exist allocations associated with z^ in the preference core.
Example 4.1. Consider the following bi-objective linear production game with three players in which the
matrix that represents the two objectives is F
C ¼ 2:5 5
3 2
  O
the technological matrix is OA ¼ 2 96 4
8 9
0
@
1
A Rand the resource vectors for the players are: Pb1 ¼ ð400; 5; 35Þt;
b2 ¼ ð15; 400; 35Þt;
b3 ¼ ð15; 5; 500Þt:UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D
In this case all the vectors in V ðNÞ can be allocated within the preference core. Let us consider the vector
z ¼ ð192; 155:2Þ that is a vector less or equal than all the vectors in V ðNÞ. It is easy to prove that the game
ðN ; vz1Þ deﬁned as:
and the game ðN ; vz2Þ is deﬁned as:
are balanced. Therefore, since z ¼ ð192; 155:2Þ6 z^ 8z^ 2 V ðNÞ we can obtain allocations in the preference
core for all vectors in V ðNÞ, using Corollary 4.1.
In order to obtain an allocation, for instance, of vector z^ ¼ ð192; 205Þ 2 V ðNÞ, we search for vectors in
the core of the corresponding component games.
Vector X1 ¼ ð60; 60; 72Þ is in the core of the game ðN ; vz^1Þ:
S {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} N
vz1ðSÞ 6.3 13 6.25 38.9 12.5 37.5 192
S {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} N
vz2ðSÞ 2.5 13 2.5 26.3 5 45 155.2
S {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} N
vz1ðSÞ 6.3 13 6.25 38.9 12.5 37.5 192
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ARTICLE IN PRESSVector X2 ¼ ð70; 70; 65Þ is in the core of the game ðN ; vz^1Þ:
Therefore, the matrix
S {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} N
vz2ðSÞ 2.5 13 2.5 26.3 5 45 205FY ¼ 60 60 72
70 70 65
 EC
TE
D
PR
OO
is an allocation of the vector ð192; 205Þ in the preference core.
Although the example above shows that every z 2 V ðNÞ can be allocated within the preference core,
there are also cases where this is not possible.
Example 2.1 (continued). Consider the two scalar 1,2-component games deﬁned in (2):
The scalar 1-component game is:
The scalar 2-component game is:
It is easy to see that the ﬁrst scalar component games is not balanced for any z^ 2 V ðNÞ. Therefore the
preference core in this game is empty by Theorem 4.2.
Example 2.2 (continued). Let us ﬁx the setup cost K ¼ 3. Consider the two component games obtained for
the non-dominated value V ðNÞ with x ¼ 2:
S {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} N
vðSÞ 6.5 9 8.25 16.75 15 17.38 vz^1
S {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} N
vðSÞ 2.786 2.25 4 5.357 6.964 6.269 vz^2R17=4 e15=4 e :UN
CO
RThe scalar 1-component game is:
The scalar 2-component game is:
S {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} N
vðSÞ 3 3 3 13
4
þ e 7
2
13
4
17
4
 e
S {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} N
vðSÞ 3 3 3 13
4
 e 7
2
13
4
 e 15
4
 e
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ARTICLE IN PRESSThe reader can check that the scalar component games are balanced and the allocation17
12
17
12
 e 17
12
1 7
4
 e 1
 belongs to the preference core.
Example 2.3 (continued). In this example, we can allocate ð2; 6Þt 2 V ðNÞ by the matrix F1 1 0
1 2 3
 CT
ED
PR
OOthat is in the preference core. This allocation has been obtained applying Birds rule to the Pareto-minimumtree given in the following ﬁgure.
It is worth noting that there are classes of OR games for which the preference core is always non-empty.
This is the case of the so called Multiobjective maintenance games (see Borm et al., 2001 for the deﬁnition of
the scalar game). These games consist of a multiobjective minimum cost spanning tree game where the
underline graph G is a tree. In this case any proportional allocation rule, as for instance Birds rule, always
belongs to the preference core. ERAcknowledgements
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